## **Oconee Timeline**

## **Date** Summary of Events 5/30/08 LIC-504 meeting. o Steve Laur gave a presentation on the process. Pat Hiland argued against pursuing flood protection on several points and was not convinced of the lack of adequate protection. o None of the developed options for review had the opportunity to be presented. o Andy Hutto (Oconee site Resident) by phone expressed concern over the condition of the roads after floodwaters recede. o Ed Williamson of OGC will work with us on any further actions. o SES concluded that a demand-for-information (50.54(f)) letter should be written and given to Jack for comment soon. 6/4/08 Met with Pat Hiland with DE, OGC and DORL. o Geary Mizuno discussed adequate protection. o Found out that the licensing basis was in the construction permit for Oconee. Lenny Olshan's argument that there was no flooding licensing basis was incorrect. Oconee is licensed to a draft version of GDC-2. Lenny admitted that he knew this all along but, didn't understand how this would help us in this project. o George Wilson discussed the "high hazard" dam classification and the inspection regime. Lenny Olshan sent out a draft version of a 50.54(f) letter. SES level meeting with Jack. o Got authorization to pursue the backfit. 6/12/08 Got a copy of the Federal Register (Volume 32, Number 132, 7/11/67) which contained the draft GDC-2 that Oconee is licensed by. 8/21/08 Met with Craig Ehrlanger (NSIR) on our interface with DHS. o Tentative meeting set with DHS representative to explain the Jocassee Dam concern on 8/25/08. Further meeting in September with Assistant DHS Secretary. o Discussed very few aspects of the Buffer Zone Protection Plan related to Jocassee Dam but could not share or show us. o Reminded Craig that Mark Cunningham discussed this issue with NSIR on November 2007. Phone call with Duke Oconee Management, Duke Headquarters PRA. Region II, and the site Residents on the dam failure frequency. o Jim Vail discussed the two failures counted for the failure frequency determination. Duke was not interested in discussing the apparent large discrepancy between our dam-year computations. Duke claimed that this call will help them put together an interim

event frequencies and consequences. Made figures instead of table.

contingency plan while they concentrate on a long term corrective

Preparation of tables for the face-to-face meeting with Duke on initiating

action.

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Date	Summary of Events
8/28/08	Face-to-face meeting with Oconee Management and Duke Headquarters
	<ul> <li>PRA.</li> <li>Duke expressed their desire to parse out dam failure frequencies into discrete inundation levels based on their two industry failure events.</li> <li>Duke claimed that they have contracted Dr. David Bowles from Utah State University to perform a dam frequency failure calculation.</li> <li>Duke discussed the spillway design of Jocassee and that it differs from the other dams in the database.</li> <li>Duke admitted that they could not reproduce the original NSAC/60 calculation of a 4.71-ft inundation height.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Duke presented the Potential Failure Modes Analysis (PFMA).</li> <li>Duke briefly brought up a potential engineering solution of installing watertight doors.</li> </ul>
9/10/08	<ul> <li>Contact to Dave Decker from Annie Caputo (Senator Boxer's office)</li> <li>regarding why NRC did not order Oconee to shut down.</li> <li>Prepared a response.</li> </ul>
9/20/08	Mike Franovich met with DHS and NSIR on Jocassee Dam failure and Oconee.
10/15/08	<ul> <li>Phone call with Duke technical personnel, Duke Headquarters PRA with NRO, DE, DORL, and Oconee site Resident.</li> <li>NRC questions on Duke's choice not to use 2-D analysis and the commitment to extend the SSF wall only by 2.5 ft.</li> <li>Duke claimed that the existing SSF wall would not be able to handle any additional load. They decided to use 1-D HEC-RAS.</li> <li>Discussed an engineering solution of installing watertight doors which would solve many of the shortcomings of the design. Ken See expressed his view that this would be the best solution.</li> <li>LIC-504 meeting (in EBB) with SES representation from DRA, DORL (detailed deputy director from DOE), and DE.</li> <li>Expressed concerns over seismic fragility.</li> <li>Large bands of sensitivity of inundation level.</li> <li>Concerns over the non-conservative breach parameters done in the original 1992 inundation study.</li> <li>Discussion of the next face-to-face meeting and that it should be a management level one.</li> <li>Watertight doors with re-engineering the intakes/ventilation appeared to be the best solution to the problem.</li> </ul>
11/14/08	<ul> <li>Call with FERC (Dan Mahoney, Ken Fearon, and Wayne King), DORL and DRA.</li> <li>Discussed the inundation calculations and how NRC views PRA vs. licensing basis.</li> <li>FERC will pull records on the dam construction.</li> <li>PRA is in the developmental stage at FERC.</li> </ul>

o FERC suggested a face-to-face meeting.

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Date		Summary of Events
11/26/08	•	Met with DHS (Craig Conklin and his staff) at their offices with DE, DRA, and NSIR.
		<ul> <li>Discussed the issue and consequences of dam rupture.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Discussed generic implications at other sites.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>DHS discussed some of their insights on infrastructure and requested some additional information from NSIR.</li> </ul>
12/1/08	•	Met with FERC at their offices (was out of office).
12/4/08	•	Met with Duke technical staff (was out of office).
12/23/08	•	Call between Duke (Rich Freudenberger) and Melanie Galloway (DRA) on the revised HEC-RAS inundation study progress.
		<ul> <li>Duke claimed that inundation levels might exceed 9 feet.</li> </ul>
2/26/09	•	DRA tour of Jocassee Dam site.
5/11/09	•	Meeting with Duke at HQ.
		<ul> <li>Duke will present only the initial phase of HEC-RAS runs done to benchmark the 1992 FERC inundation study.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Jack Grobe reiterated the NRC position that this is an adequate</li> </ul>

- protection and not a PRA issue.Duke had not done any sensitivity calculations to vary breach
- Duke had not done any sensitivity calculations to vary breach parameters.
- Duke argued that NRC in the past did not cite Yankee-Rowe on not having adequate protection against failure of the Harriman Dam as a precedent.
- Discussed lumped answers to the HEC-RAS analysis questions due to time constraints.